BDS-1000 Dossier: Lockheed Martin Corporation

Key Findings

• Military: Lockheed Martin supplies the F-35I Adir to the Israeli Air Force under the US Foreign Military Sales programme; these aircraft have been used in documented strikes on Gaza since October 2023.¹²³⁴
• Economic: Lockheed Martin and IAI hold a $4 billion contract (UICA programme) for F-35 composite-wing production in Israel, making Israel an active manufacturing node in Lockheed’s global supply chain.⁵⁴
• Political: Lockheed Martin lobbied in support of the Israel Security Supplemental appropriations; its CEO publicly described the October 2023 attacks as generating “significant replenishment demand” for its products.⁶⁷
• Digital: Lockheed Martin supplies C2 systems and ISR platforms integrated into Israeli military operations, establishing a documented surveillance and digital-nexus footprint.¹⁴

Target Profile

Executive Summary

Lockheed Martin Corporation stands as the single most significant foreign military supplier to the State of Israel among Western defense primes. The company’s documented involvement spans direct weapons transfers through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, deep supply chain integration with Israeli defense industries (Israel Aerospace Industries, Elbit Systems, Rafael), and sustained operational sustainment of Israeli Air Force platforms deployed in combat over Gaza and the occupied territories. The Military domain score of 9.50 reflects this comprehensive military supply relationship, which includes the F-35I ‘Adir’ program (48 delivered, 75 on order), CH-53K heavy-lift helicopters (12 on order), AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, JDAM guidance kits, and PAC-3 MSE interceptors ¹²³.

The Economic score of 7.00 captures Lockheed Martin’s $4 billion cumulative investment in Israeli defense industries under the Umbrella Industrial Cooperation Agreement (UICA), extended through 2029, alongside IAI’s $2.5 billion F-35 wing production contract and Elbit’s $34 million F-35 external fuel tank contract ⁵⁸. The Political score of 8.50 reflects the company’s $13-14 million annual federal lobbying expenditure, active engagement on Israel security supplemental appropriations, and CEO James Taiclet’s characterization of post-October 7 demand as a “replenishment demand” and revenue-positive development ⁷. The Digital score of 2.53 is lower, reflecting enterprise technology relationships (Cybereason investment, XTEND integration) that, while verified, are more limited in scope than the defense supply relationship ⁹¹⁰¹¹.

The company has not issued public statements addressing the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion (July 2024) or the ICC arrest warrants for Israeli officials (November 2024), and did not respond to the UN Special Rapporteur’s communication calling on arms companies to cease transfers to Israel ³⁸. The resulting BRS score of 819 places Lockheed Martin in Tier A (Extreme), driven by the maximum Military score and high scores across economic and political domains. No evidence supports claims of settlement construction involvement, civilian retail operations, or base services in occupied territories - these vectors are not applicable to a defense prime ³¹².

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

Lockheed Martin Corporation was formed in March 1995 through the merger of Lockheed Corporation (founded 1912) and Martin Marietta (founded 1961). The company operates as a publicly traded Delaware corporation (NYSE: LMT) with no government ownership stakes. Approximately 71-73% of net sales derive from the U.S. federal government, making the U.S. government Lockheed Martin’s single largest customer ²¹.

Israeli Subsidiary: Lockheed Martin Israel Ltd. is registered with the Israel Companies Registrar, operating from Berkovitch 4 (Museum Tower), Tel Aviv. The subsidiary functions as a business development, programme liaison, and government relations office, led by CEO Joshua (Shani) Shani. A demonstration center features F-35 and CH-53K simulators. No manufacturing facilities, data centers, or logistics hubs in Israel have been identified ^1132220.

Key Israeli Defense Relationships:

• Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI): Tier-1 supplier for F-35 wing sections; $2.5B contract for 800+ wing pairs; 350th wing delivered February 2026 ⁶⁷¹²
• Elbit Systems: Avionics, helmet-mounted displays, electronic warfare; $34M contract for F-35I external fuel tanks ⁸⁷
• Rafael Advanced Defense Systems: SPICE weapon system partnership; HELWS/IRON BEAM laser cooperation ³

Umbrella Industrial Cooperation Agreement (UICA): Extended through 2029; $4B invested since 2005; $470M invested 2020-2024; expected collaboration exceeds $6B ⁵⁴

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

Lockheed Martin’s military involvement with Israel operates exclusively through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, under which contractual privity exists between Lockheed Martin and the U.S. Department of Defense, with Israel as the designated end-user. This is the primary mechanism: all major platform transfers flow through government-to-government FMS channels, not direct commercial sales.

The F-35I ‘Adir’ programme represents the flagship element. Israel has taken delivery of 48 F-35I aircraft as of early 2026, with 50 on order and a fourth squadron approved (25 additional aircraft), projecting a fleet of approximately 100 aircraft. A $3 billion LOA for 25 additional aircraft was signed in April 2024, funded through U.S. Foreign Military Financing, with deliveries commencing in 2028 ^12341120.

The CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter programme constitutes a second major FMS transaction. The DSCA notified Congress in July 2021 of a potential $3.4 billion sale. Israel signed the FMS agreement on December 30, 2021. A mission systems contract was signed in March 2025 with Sikorsky to integrate Israeli mission systems into all 12 aircraft, with first delivery expected in 2028 ¹¹⁹.

Additional systems include: JDAM guidance kits (large quantities supplied pre- and post-October 7, 2023; May 2024 pause on 1,800 × 2,000-lb bomb kits reversed January 2025); AGM-114 Hellfire missiles (extensively used by IAF AH-64 Apache helicopters and armed UAVs); PAC-3 MSE interceptors (supplied in 2024 to replenish stocks); and C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft ³¹⁵¹⁷.

The THAAD deployment in October 2024 following Iranian ballistic missile attacks represents direct use of a Lockheed Martin-produced system on Israeli territory, though under U.S. operational control with U.S. military personnel ³.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest counter-arguments available to Lockheed Martin are structural: all weapons transfers flow through the U.S. FMS system, meaning the U.S. government - specifically the Department of State and Department of Defense - bears export licensing responsibility, not Lockheed Martin as a corporate entity. The company does not independently direct shipments; it fulfills U.S. government contract requirements. Additionally, Lockheed Martin is not a party to the ICJ Advisory Opinion or ICC proceedings, and no direct litigation against the company has been identified.

The company could argue that its platforms are used for legitimate self-defense, that Israel is a key F-35 program partner with unique integration rights, and that sustainment contracts cover operational bases within Israel proper (not occupied territories). The company has not been included in the UN OHCHR Settlement Business Enterprises Database, which covers civilian settlement activities rather than arms manufacturers ¹⁸²²¹².

However, these arguments are substantially undermined by: the continued supply post-ICJ and post-ICC without due diligence statements; the CEO’s explicit framing of post-October 7 demand as revenue-positive; the company’s $13-14 million annual lobbying on defense appropriations including Israel security supplements; and the UN Special Rapporteur’s specific communication to Lockheed Martin ⁶³²³⁸⁷.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

Lockheed Martin’s digital and technology involvement with Israel is substantially narrower than its military supply relationship but includes verified enterprise technology deployments.

The company made a strategic investment in Cybereason, an Israeli cybersecurity firm, in May 2015, providing $25 million in Series B funding as part of a broader strategic partnership. Cybereason’s defense-grade endpoint detection platform was deployed across more than 120,000 endpoints within Lockheed Martin’s internal network infrastructure ⁹¹⁰.

Lockheed Martin Skunk Works integrated XTEND’s XOS operating system into the MDCX (Multi-Class Drone Command) platform for multi-drone JADC2 (Joint All-Domain Command and Control) capabilities, with a public demonstration in November 2025 ¹¹.

The ODIN (Operational Data Integrated Network) system provides logistics and fleet management software to the IAF as part of the F-35 programme, handling maintenance scheduling, mission data, parts logistics, and prognostics. While ODIN incorporates machine learning algorithms for predictive maintenance, its application is logistics and operational readiness management, not targeting. Data flows through U.S.-based processing nodes, not Israeli infrastructure ⁶.

Lockheed Martin operates an innovation center in Tel Aviv established in 2019, focused on identifying Israeli defense-technology startups and dual-use technologies. The registered subsidiary Lockheed Martin Israel Ltd provides the corporate vehicle for this presence ⁸¹³.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Lockheed Martin could argue that its digital relationships are limited in scope: the Cybereason investment and deployment is enterprise cybersecurity (defensive), not surveillance or targeting technology; the XTEND integration is command-and-control for drone swarming, not autonomous lethal weapons; and ODIN is logistics software, not intelligence or targeting systems.

The company is not a cloud infrastructure provider and was not a bidder or awardee of Project Nimbus (Israel’s sovereign cloud programme). No evidence identifies Lockheed Martin deploying facial recognition, biometric identification, or predictive policing tools in Israel or occupied territories. No data centers or cloud operations in Israel have been identified ⁶⁹.

However, the innovation center and subsidiary presence demonstrate ongoing engagement with the Israeli technology ecosystem, and the ODIN relationship - while logistics-focused - provides software services to the IAF as part of the F-35 ecosystem.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

Lockheed Martin’s economic involvement with Israel operates through three primary vectors: direct investment and offset obligations under the UICA framework, supply chain subcontracting with Israeli defense firms, and the F-35 programme’s unique industrial cooperation arrangements.

The Umbrella Industrial Cooperation Agreement (UICA) with Israel’s Industrial Cooperation Authority has been extended through 2029. Lockheed Martin has invested over $4 billion in Israeli defense and aerospace industries since 2005, with $470 million invested during the 2020-2024 period. Expected collaboration exceeds $6 billion ⁵⁴.

Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) serves as the most significant tier-1 supplier through the F-35 programme. IAI’s Lahav and Bedek Divisions produce composite wing sections and structural assemblies under a contract valued at approximately $2.5 billion over 15 years to manufacture over 800 wing pairs. IAI delivered its 350th F-35 wing to Lockheed Martin in February 2026, with a contract extending through 2034 for potentially 800+ wing sets with a potential value exceeding $2 billion ⁶⁷¹².

Elbit Systems holds a long-standing supplier relationship, providing avionics, helmet-mounted display systems, and electronic warfare components. A $34 million contract was awarded to Elbit for F-35I extended-range external fuel tanks, marking the first-ever F-35 external fuel tank integration ⁸⁷.

The F-35I ‘Adir’ programme confers unique industrial benefits: Israel is the only F-35 operator permitted to integrate domestic weapons systems into the F-35 mission systems architecture, including Israeli-developed electronic warfare suites, missiles, and intelligence systems. An $11.4 million Lockheed Martin contract modification supports Israel-specific F-35 software development ²⁴²³¹².

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Lockheed Martin’s strongest economic counter-arguments include: the company does not manufacture in Israel or occupied territories; the Israeli subsidiary is a liaison office, not a production facility; no real estate holdings or manufacturing plants in the territories have been identified; and the company is not included in the UN OHCHR Settlement Business Enterprise Database, which covers civilian settlement activities ¹⁴¹².

The company could argue that offset obligations are standard for foreign defense contractors and reflect industrial cooperation rather than economic complicity; that investment figures represent subcontracting value, not profit repatriation; and that Israel is not a standalone revenue segment in corporate filings.

However, the $4 billion cumulative investment, the $2.5 billion IAI wing contract, and the extension of the UICA through 2029 - well after the ICJ Advisory Opinion - demonstrate sustained economic engagement. The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global has excluded Lockheed Martin from its portfolio due to cluster munitions production, and the company is named in the UN Special Rapporteur’s report on the “economy of genocide” (June 2025) and the Amnesty International September 2025 report ²²⁴¹⁰.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

Lockheed Martin’s political involvement manifests through corporate communications, lobbying activity, executive engagement, and the company’s response (or non-response) to international legal developments.

Corporate Communications: Lockheed Martin has maintained a notably restrained public posture regarding the Israel-Gaza conflict since October 7, 2023. No dedicated public statement specifically addressing the conflict has been issued. CEO James Taiclet addressed post-October 7 procurement as “replenishment demand” and a positive revenue driver in Q4 2023 and Q1-Q2 2024 earnings calls, continuing to reference elevated “Middle East” demand as revenue-positive without humanitarian commentary ⁷.

Lobbying: Lockheed Martin is among the largest corporate lobbying spenders in the U.S. defense sector, spending approximately $13-14 million annually on federal lobbying in 2022-2024. The company lobbied on H.R.6126 (Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024). Lobbying disclosure topics include defense appropriations, F-35 program funding, foreign military sales policy, and export controls ⁶.

Response to International Legal Developments: No public statement by Lockheed Martin acknowledging the ICJ Advisory Opinion (July 2024) or the ICC arrest warrants (November 2024) was identified. The company did not respond to the UN Special Rapporteur’s communication (AL OTH 78/2024, May 2024) calling on arms companies to cease transfers to Israel ³⁸.

Executive Engagement: Joshua Shani, CEO of Lockheed Martin Israel, serves as keynote speaker at Friends of the IDF (FIDF) events. FIDF is an Israeli military-welfare organization ¹⁶.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Lockheed Martin’s strongest political counter-arguments include: the company operates within the U.S. FMS system, meaning all foreign military sales require U.S. government authorization; no board member holds a leadership role in AIPAC, FIDF, JNF, or equivalent advocacy organizations per proxy statements; the company has not sponsored Israeli state-backed cultural diplomacy campaigns; and no executive personal donations to Israeli parastatal organizations have been identified in public records ¹¹.

The company could argue that its lobbying activity is standard for defense contractors and focuses on policy rather than specific human rights positions; that CEO statements reflect standard earnings call discourse; and that the absence of public statements on ICJ/ICC proceedings reflects the company’s position that it is not a party to those proceedings.

However, the company did not respond to the UN Special Rapporteur’s communication; the CEO’s explicit framing of wartime demand as revenue-positive contrasts with statements following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (where the company issued statements referencing commitment to supporting U.S. allies); and the FIDF executive engagement demonstrates direct connection to Israeli military-welfare activities ³²³⁸⁷.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

BDS-1000 Score (V4)

• V_MAX: 9.50 Sum_OTHERS: 18.03
• BRS Score: 819 Tier: A (Extreme)

The Military score of 9.50 (maximum) reflects Lockheed Martin’s position as the primary U.S. FMS contractor supplying the Israeli Air Force with F-35I, CH-53K, Hellfire, JDAM, and PAC-3 systems - platforms documented in combat deployment over Gaza and the occupied territories. Combined with high Political (8.50) driven by $13-14M annual lobbying, executive characterization of wartime demand as revenue-positive, and non-response to UN communications, and Economic (7.00) reflecting $4B cumulative investment in Israeli defense industries, the resulting BRS of 819 places the company in Tier A (Extreme). The methodology uses scale-free Impact × Magnitude/Proximity, evidence-only sourcing from the four domain audits, with human-vetted scores.

Methodology Note

• Evidence-only sourcing: All factual claims trace to the four domain audits (Military, Digital, Economic, Political). No unverified allegations are included.
• Scale-free Impact (I): Measures activity type severity - military weapons transfers score highest; digital technology relationships score moderate; economic investment and supply chain integration score high; political lobbying and public communications score high.
• Magnitude (M): Assesses scale of involvement - F-35 fleet size, investment dollar amounts, lobbying expenditure, number of platforms.
• Proximity (P): Measures directness - FMS contracts (direct), supply chain relationships (direct but tiered), technology investments (verified but limited), corporate communications (direct).
• Temporal rule: Divested or exited operations would mitigate scores; no such exits were identified for Lockheed Martin.
• Entity attribution: No transitive guilt - only Lockheed Martin corporate actions are scored, not the actions of customers or partners.
• Settlement operation dual-count: Where relevant, settlement-adjacent activities would count toward both Economic and Political; no settlement construction involvement was identified for Lockheed Martin.
• “No public evidence identified”: Used where audit checks found nothing (e.g., no construction equipment in territories, no facial recognition deployment, no base services).

End Notes