Digital Audit: Ferrari N.V.

Audit Phase: Digital (Digital / Technology Forensics) Subject Entity: Ferrari N.V. (NYSE / Euronext Milan: RACE) Registered Office: Amsterdam, The Netherlands; principal operating address Via Abetone Inferiore N. 4, 41053 Maranello (MO), Italy Audit Date: June 2026 Evidence Base: Published corporate disclosures and SEC Form 20-F filings, vendor press releases, trade and technology press, cybersecurity reporting, and NGO/regulatory material. All factual claims are drawn from publicly available sources cited in the End Notes.

Scope and directionality note: Digital assesses the digital/technology nexus to Israel. The serious case is the provision of surveillance, digital, data, or cyber technology to the Israeli state, military, or security services. The reverse direction - Ferrari procuring technology from Israeli-origin vendors - is a customer relationship and is recorded explicitly as such, weighted far lower than provision. US-headquartered vendors (e.g. Amazon Web Services, IBM, HP) are not Israeli-origin and are recorded for completeness only. No transitive guilt is imputed: a vendor’s other clients, its founders’ backgrounds, or a parent group’s separate activities are not attributed to Ferrari.

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

Strategic Technology Partnerships (Direction: Ferrari as customer)

Ferrari’s principal disclosed enterprise technology relationship is with Amazon Web Services (AWS), a US-headquartered entity (Seattle, WA). In June 2021 AWS announced an agreement to become Ferrari’s “Official Cloud, Machine Learning, and Artificial Intelligence Provider,” covering the road cars department, GT Competitions, the Ferrari Challenge, and the Scuderia Ferrari Formula 1 team; the announcement names the AWS Europe (Milan) region for design and testing workloads and a Scuderia Ferrari digital fan-engagement platform.¹² AWS is a US-entity relationship and is not Israeli-origin.¹

IBM (US-origin, Armonk, NY) was announced in November 2024 as the Official Fan Engagement and Data Analytics Partner of Scuderia Ferrari HP under a multi-year agreement beginning in 2025, building a reimagined mobile app and AI/data-analytics features (IBM has described use of its watsonx AI in the relaunched app).³⁴ This is a US-entity relationship recorded for completeness.

HP Inc. (US-origin, Palo Alto, CA) became title partner of the Formula 1 team - rebranded “Scuderia Ferrari HP” - under a multi-year partnership announced on 24 April 2024, supplying PCs, conferencing technology, and printing capabilities across the racing operations.⁵⁶ This is a US-entity relationship.

Israeli-Origin Technology Vendors in the Ferrari Stack (Direction: Ferrari as customer)

No public evidence was identified of Ferrari holding any licensing, subscription, integration, or managed-services relationship with an Israeli-origin enterprise-technology, analytics, or cybersecurity vendor - including Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE Systems, Verint, Cognyte, or Claroty. Ferrari’s publicly named technology partner ecosystem (AWS, IBM, HP) is composed of US-headquartered entities.¹³⁵ No public evidence identified.

Israeli-Origin Cybersecurity Vendors

No public evidence was identified confirming that Ferrari deploys any Israeli-origin cybersecurity product. When Ferrari disclosed its March 2023 ransomware-linked data breach, it stated it had engaged “a leading global third-party cybersecurity firm” to investigate but declined to name the vendor; no public reporting identified an Israeli-origin incident-response or endpoint-security firm in the remediation.⁷⁸ The internal security stack (EDR, SIEM, network monitoring) is undisclosed. No public evidence identified.

Procurement Transparency Constraints

Ferrari N.V. is a publicly listed private-sector company; its SEC Form 20-F filings and annual reports do not enumerate the full enterprise IT and security vendor stack beyond named commercial partners.⁹ Sub-strategic vendor relationships, including any third-party managed-service providers, are not in the public domain. This is the principal evidence gap in this domain.

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

Facial Recognition & Biometric Identification

No public evidence was identified of Ferrari deploying facial-recognition, biometric-identification, gait-analysis, emotion-recognition, or behavioural-analytics technology of Israeli origin (e.g. Oosto/AnyVision, BriefCam, Corsight, Trigo, Trax) at its Maranello factory, dealer network, museums, or Formula 1 hospitality environments. Public reporting on Maranello site controls covers general physical security and a 2020 COVID-era employee health programme, with no biometric-surveillance vendor named.¹⁰ No public evidence identified.

No public evidence was identified of Ferrari using Israeli-origin predictive-analytics, sentiment-analysis, social-media-monitoring, or workforce-surveillance tooling. No public evidence identified.

Connected-Vehicle Telematics & Customer Data

Ferrari operates a connected-car service, “MyFerrari Connect,” which transmits vehicle status and diagnostic data to owners and to dealers for maintenance scheduling.¹¹ No public evidence was identified that the platform or its data processing relies on an Israeli-origin vendor, nor that customer or telematics data is routed to any Israeli entity. No public evidence identified.

Third-Party & Bundled Deployment

No public evidence was identified of Israeli-origin surveillance or biometric technology reaching Ferrari indirectly through third-party platform providers, managed-security providers, or bundled enterprise suites. The sub-tier vendor layer is undisclosed and cannot be positively excluded on public evidence. No public evidence identified.

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

Data Centre Operations in Israel

No public evidence was identified that Ferrari operates, leases, or co-locates data-centre infrastructure within Israel. Ferrari’s disclosed cloud strategy centres on AWS, with the AWS Europe (Milan) region named for design/testing workloads; no Israeli AWS region is identified as a designated Ferrari data-processing location.¹² No public evidence identified.

Project Nimbus & Israeli State Cloud Infrastructure

Not applicable. Project Nimbus is the Israeli-government cloud contract awarded to Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services; Ferrari is neither a participant nor a sub-provider. No public evidence was identified of Ferrari involvement in any Israeli state-backed digital-infrastructure programme.¹ No public evidence identified.

Data-Sovereignty or Resilience Services to Israeli State Institutions

No public evidence identified. Ferrari is an automotive manufacturer and does not operate as a cloud, managed-infrastructure, or data-residency provider to any state body, Israeli or otherwise.⁹

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

Military & Intelligence Contracts

No public evidence was identified of any contract, partnership, or service agreement between Ferrari and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), or Israeli intelligence agencies. Ferrari is a luxury automotive manufacturer and does not publicly operate in the defence-technology or security-services sector.⁹ No public evidence identified.

Provision of Technology / Data to the Israeli State or Military

No public evidence was identified of Ferrari providing surveillance technology, data, software, cloud capacity, or digital services to the Israeli state, military, or security services. This is the directionally serious Digital case, and no qualifying evidence of it was found. No public evidence identified.

Dual-Use Technology Provision

No public evidence was identified of Ferrari’s engineering, aerodynamics, materials-science, or data-analytics capabilities being deployed for military, intelligence, or law-enforcement surveillance applications in Israel or the occupied Palestinian territories. No public evidence identified.

Offensive Cyber Capability

No public evidence identified. Ferrari does not develop, license, or sell offensive cyber capability, and holds no documented relationship with Israeli defence contractors (Elbit Systems, Rafael, IAI, ELTA) or surveillance-software firms (NSO Group, Cellebrite, Cognyte). Ferrari was itself the victim of a ransomware-linked data breach disclosed on 20 March 2023: a threat actor exfiltrated client contact details (names, addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers) and issued a ransom demand, which Ferrari refused to pay; the company found no evidence that payment data was compromised and reported no operational impact.⁷⁸ This incident was done to Ferrari and has no nexus to the provision of technology to Israel; it is recorded as factual digital context only.

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

AI/ML Provision to Israeli State Bodies

No public evidence identified. Ferrari’s documented AI/ML activity is confined to the automotive and motorsport domain - Formula 1 race-strategy modelling, power-unit assembly optimisation, and pit-stop analysis built on AWS, and fan-engagement analytics built on IBM watsonx.¹³¹² No public evidence was identified of Ferrari providing AI capability, model access, training data, or inference services to any Israeli state, military, or security body.

Training Data & Model Development Involving Israeli Population Data

No public evidence was identified of Ferrari AI/ML models being trained on, or granted access to, datasets derived from civilian surveillance, intercepted communications, or intelligence collection in Israel or the occupied territories. No public evidence identified.

Autonomous Systems & Lethality

No public evidence identified. The development or deployment of autonomous lethal systems is not within Ferrari’s business domain.

Internal Algorithmic Deployment - Israeli-Origin AI Tooling

Ferrari’s documented internal AI deployment runs through US-entity platforms (AWS, IBM watsonx).¹³ No public evidence was identified of any Israeli-origin AI vendor embedded in Ferrari’s stack; the undisclosed full vendor list means secondary embedding within managed services cannot be positively excluded, but no such instance was identified. No public evidence identified.

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

Israeli R&D Facilities

No public evidence was identified that Ferrari operates any R&D facility, engineering office, innovation lab, or accelerator programme within Israel. Ferrari’s R&D is centred on Maranello, with test activity at Fiorano and Mugello.⁹ No public evidence identified.

Acquisitions & Investments in Israeli Technology Companies

No public evidence was identified of Ferrari acquiring, or taking a corporate-venture stake in, any Israeli technology company, accelerator, or venture fund. Press coverage of automaker investment in Israeli mobility/autonomous-driving startups names other manufacturers (e.g. Volkswagen, Ford, GM, Daimler, Porsche), not Ferrari.¹³ No public evidence identified of an Israeli-registered Ferrari subsidiary.⁹

Patents & IP Co-Development with Israeli Institutions

No public evidence was identified of patent portfolios, licensing, or co-development arrangements between Ferrari and Israeli-domiciled entities or research institutions (Technion, Hebrew University, Weizmann Institute). No public evidence identified.

Supplier Code of Conduct - Technology Supply-Chain Provisions

No public evidence was identified that Ferrari’s supplier-conduct or responsible-sourcing frameworks contain provisions governing the national origin or geopolitical exposure of technology vendors, software suppliers, or digital-infrastructure providers.⁹ No technology-supply-chain due-diligence framework specific to vendor geopolitical exposure is publicly documented by Ferrari. No public evidence identified.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

NGO & Academic Scrutiny - Technology Supply Chain

No public evidence was identified of an NGO investigation, academic study, or UN report addressing Ferrari’s technology relationships with the Israeli state, Israeli defence entities, or Israeli-origin vendors. The Who Profits Research Center database documents corporate involvement in the occupation economy; no Ferrari entry addressing technology provision was identified in available material.¹⁴ No public evidence identified.

BDS Campaigns

No public evidence was identified of an organised boycott, divestment, or sanctions (BDS) campaign targeting Ferrari specifically in relation to technology provision to Israel. Ferrari does not appear on the BDS National Committee’s priority targeted-companies list in available material.¹⁵ Ferrari sells vehicles in Israel via an official local dealer/importer (a customer-side commercial presence recorded in the Economic domain), but no public source ties that presence to technology provision. No public evidence identified.

Data-Protection / ICO-Equivalent Scrutiny - 2023 Breach

The March 2023 breach compromised Ferrari customer personal data and engaged data-protection obligations; this exposure concerns Ferrari’s posture as the victim of an attack and the adequacy of its data-security controls, and is not connected to any Israeli-origin technology relationship.⁷⁸ No public evidence identified of any regulatory finding linking the breach to an Israel nexus.

Export Controls & Sanctions Authorities

No public evidence was identified of any action by export-control or sanctions authorities (US BIS, Italian UAMA, EU registers) relating to Ferrari technology sales, services, or data transfers to Israeli state entities. Comprehensive UAMA records are not fully available in the public domain, which is a structural limitation. No public evidence identified.

Evidence Gaps

Full IT and security vendor stack (highest priority) - Ferrari does not publicly disclose its sub-strategic IT and security vendor relationships. The 2023 breach surfaced only an unnamed “leading global third-party cybersecurity firm”; the resident security-product stack is undisclosed, so Israeli-origin cybersecurity-vendor exposure cannot be positively excluded on public evidence.
Connected-vehicle data processing - The vendor and data-routing architecture behind MyFerrari Connect telematics is not publicly detailed; Israeli-origin components within sub-tier connected-car platforms cannot be assessed.
AWS / IBM marketplace sub-components - Ferrari’s AWS and IBM relationships create potential indirect exposure to marketplace add-ons (some Israeli-origin); whether Ferrari has procured any such add-on is not publicly documented.
Formula 1 sub-tier vendors - Scuderia Ferrari’s F1 technical operations involve numerous undisclosed sub-tier vendors (telemetry, simulation, CFD); Israeli-origin products within them cannot be confirmed or excluded.
Who Profits / Italian UAMA records - A targeted Who Profits entry for Ferrari technology activity and comprehensive Italian export-licensing records were not fully available in public sources.